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NOTES

IS LIABILITY JUST A LINK AWAY? TRADEMARK
DILUTION BY TARNISHMENT UNDER THE
FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995
AND HYPERLINKS ON THE WORLD WIDE WEB
Every day, people all over the country "surf" the World Wide Web for
information on every topic imaginable-from class assignments to travel
itineraries to gossip on Hollywood stars. The Web has introduced our
society to new possibilities in communication, education, business, and
entertainment. Along with those possibilities, though, come the difficulties
faced by courts in applying existing law to new technology and defining the
legal parameters of the new medium. In particular, the Internet and Web
have created new legal complications in the protection of intellectual
property rights.
Federal trademark dilution is a new cause of action in intellectual
property that provides owners of famous trademarks with additional
ammunition against those who use their marks.1 This Note will address how
courts have and should apply the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA)2
to alleged trademark dilution by tarnishment as it relates to hyperlinking on
the World Wide Web. To understand the policies of the FTDA and its
application to hyperlinking, it is necessary to explore the development of the
dilution doctrine and explain the Web features involved in trademark
dilution by tarnishment cases. Part I of this Note will describe the development and present status of federal trademark dilution law and Part II will
explain the Web features of domain names and linking.

The Federal
1,L
2See

Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c) (1995).
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I. TRADEMARK DILUTION: AN OVERVIEW
A. THE EVOLUTION OF TRADEMARK DILUTION

While the Constitution authorizes Congress to legislate intellectual
property protection in the form of copyright and patent,3 the Constitution
does not give Congress the power to protect trademarks. Instead, this power
stems from Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce under the
Commerce Clause.4 Trademark law is a part of the broader law of unfair
competition.5 The primary purpose of a trademark is to "identify the origin
or ownership of the article to which it is affixed."6 Trademarks help
customers select goods of a known quality with low transaction costs, and
they operate as symbols of a company's goodwill.7
Federal trademark dilution is a new cause of action, provided for under
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) of 1995, an amendment to the
Lanham Act.8 The FTDA went into effect on January 16,1996, when signed
by President Clinton.9 The FTDA provides a level of trademark protection
unprecedented in the United States by giving trademark owners a federal
cause of action for dilution of famous marks.'
The policies advanced by dilution are different from those driving the law
of trademark infringement. Trademark infringement law embodies two
basic aims: to ensure that the public is not misled or confused about
products and to protect the property rights of the trademark owner.'
Dilution, on the other hand, does not require consumer confusion as an

' See U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8, d. 8 (authorizing the "securing for limited Times to Authors and

Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries).

4 ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTEuEcTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 558

(Richard A. Epstein et al. ed., Aspen Publishers, Inc. 2000). See U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8, cl. 3 (authorizing

Congress to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes").

' Siegrum D. Kane, Overiew of Trademark Law, in Trademark Law: A Practitioner's Guide 2001
(PLI,Practice Guide, 2001), LEXIS, PLI Intellectual Property Publications File.
6 Id (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916)).
'Kane, supra note 5.
15 U.S.C. S 1125(c). The Lanham Act is the popular name for the federal trademark statute. 15
U.S.C. S 1051.
9 See 2-5 GLSON ON TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE S 5.12 (Matthew Bender & Co.
2001).

10/I
I IdL
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element of the cause of action."2 Rather, dilution law's primary concern is
protecting the distinctiveness of an owner's famous trademark." The
concept of dilution recognizes the "substantial investment the owner has
made in the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself,
protecting both from those who would appropriate the mark for their own
" 14
gain.
Though federal trademark dilution is a fairly new cause of action, the
concept of dilution is not new. In an influential 1927 law review article,
Frank I. Schechter, a trademark lawyer, used a wood carving metaphor to
illustrate the type of harm caused by trademark dilution."3 He proposed a
cause of action for "the gradual whittling away or dispersion" of a mark's
public identity by its use on non-competing goods.' 6
The earliest attempt at a federal trademark dilution statute was in 1932,
with the proposed "Perkins" bill.' The bill would have protected federally
registered "coined or inventive or fanciful or arbitrary" trademarks against
uses that might "injure the goodwill, reputation, and business credit" of the
mark's owner.'" Hostility in the legislature toward granting property rights
in trademarks, though, hindered the progress of the Perkins bill. 9
Although the proposal failed, states slowly began to enact trademark
dilution legislation, beginning with Massachusetts in 1947.20 At the time of
FTDA enactment, twenty-five states had trademark dilution statutes.2 ' The
FTDA was not intended to preempt existing state dilution laws.22 Trademark owners whose marks do not meet the "famous" requirement of the
FTDA still have remedies available under these state dilution laws.23

Id.
"' Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, H.R. REP. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030.
" Frank I. Schechter, The RationalBasis of TrademarkProtection,40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 825 (1927).
16 Id.
' 2-5 GILSON, supra note 9 S 5.12.
",

B Id.
19 IU.

H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995).
Id. Unlike patent and copyright law, federal trademark law coexists with state trademark law. See
U
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 937 F. Supp. 204, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
" See, eg., Advantage Rent-A-Car v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, 238 F.3d 378,57 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1561
(5th Cir. 2001) (neither Texas nor Louisiana anti-dilution statutes require mark to be famous in order to
be protected; the mark need only be distinctive); Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Allied Old English, Inc., 831
21
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The FTDA was enacted, in part, because the state "patch-quilt system of
[dilution] protection" provided inadequate protection for nationally used and
recognized marks. 4 The legislature was also concerned with the inconsistency in state court decisions; national consistency in dilution law became a
legislative goal." Although most state statutes did not require consumer
confusion, some courts required a showing of likelihood of confusion to
obtain relief.2 6 Additionally, many courts were hesitant to issue nationwide
injunctions for trademark dilution when numerous states did not recognize
dilution as a cause of action and the claims were brought under state
statutes. 7
The FTDA allows the owners of "famous marks" to receive an injunction
against unauthorized commercial uses that cause "dilution of the distinctive
quality of the mark."28 The Act applies without regard to the competition
between the owner of the famous mark and the accused or to likelihood of
confusion of the marks. 9 Normally, the owner of the famous mark will be
entitled only to injunctive relief upon a finding of liability, but if a defendant
willfully intended to trade on the trademark owner's reputation or dilute the
mark's distinctiveness, an award of damages is available, including the
possibility of treble damages.' The Act applies only to "famous" marks and
provides courts with eight nonexclusive factors to consider in deciding
whether a mark is "famous" for purposes of dilution. 1

F. Supp. 123,134, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (mark need not be famous to be protected
under New York's anti-dilution statute).
24H.R. REP. No. 104-374. The FTDA also made U.S. law consistent with the Agreement on Trade-

Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights ("TRIPS'), including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, which
was part of the Uruguay Round of the GAT' agreement and the Paris Convention. Id.
25 Id
26 2-5 GILSON, supra note 9 S 5.12.
27 i

' 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1) (1995).
15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1997).
H.R. REP. No. 104-374. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(2).
3115 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(1). These factors are: the distinctiveness of the mark, the duration and extent
"

of its use, the duration and extent of its advertising, the geographical extent of its use, the channels of trade
in which it is used, the degree of recognition of the mark, third-party use of similar marks, and whether
the mark was federally registered. Id For litigation over the famousness requirement of the FTDA, see
Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (9th Cir. 1999) (Avery"
and "Dennison" trademarks were not 'famous' because the evidence did not show the marks to be more
than merely distinctive); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27,49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225
(1st Cir. 1998) (observing that national renown is an important factor in determining whether a mark
qualifies as "famous" under the FTDA).
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B. WHAT IS DILUTION UNDER THE FTDA?

The term "dilution" is defined in the Lanham Act as "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,
regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition between the owner
of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception."32 The legislative history of the FTDA shows reliance
on state dilution statutes and decisions, which generally placed dilution into
two categories: dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment."
1. Dilutionby Blurring. "Blurring" involves the "whittling away of the
selling power and value of a trademark by unauthorized use of the mark."34
Dilution by blurring occurs where a defendant uses an exact or modified
version of the plaintiff's mark, raising the possibility that the mark will lose
its ability to serve as the "unique identifier" of the plaintiff's product." For
example, Pepperidge Farm successfully brought a dilution by blurring claim
under the FTDA against Nabisco for the latter's use of the "Cat Dog"
cracker, an orange, bite-sized cheddar-cheese flavored, goldfish-shaped
cracker, used in promotion of a children's television program.' The court
found that Nabisco's use of the cracker would dilute the distinctive quality
of Pepperidge Farm's "Goldfish" mark, which consisted of a similar goldfishshaped cracker.3"
Blurring can also involve use of a famous mark on a dissimilar product.
Some hypothetical examples would include DUPONT shoes, BUICK
39
aspirin, and KODAK pianos.
2. Dilution by Tarnishment. "Tamishment" occurs when a famous
trademark is associated with products of poor quality, or is portrayed in an

2 15 U.S.C. S 1127 (1997).
" H.R. REP. No. 104-374.
'4 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296,1304,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908,1914 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
" Clinique Labs., Inc. v. DEP Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). See also THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETTION S 24:68 at 24-111 (4th ed.
1997).
" Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 51 US.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2d Cir. 1999).
37 Id
382-5 GILSON, supra note 9 S 5.12; I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 (Ist Cir. 1998)
(FTDA applies to products which are competitors as well as to products which are totally dissimilar and

are not competitors).
'4

H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995).
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unsavory or immoral context.: For example, the Second Circuit enjoined
the promotion of a pornographic movie that used costumes closely
resembling those of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders under the theory of
dilution by tamishment.4 ' Although most tarnishment claims arise from a
mark being associated with pornography, courts have also found dilution
from a mark's association with illegal drug use, crude jokes, and racist
material.42
The willingness of a court to grant relief for trademark dilution by
tarnishment appears most influenced by how offensive the use is. Not every
association a plaintiff views as unfavorable gives rise to dilution by
tarnishment. For instance, in Clinique Laboratories,Inc. v. DEP Corp., the
court held that a competitor's production of allegedly "cheap knockoffs" of
the plaintiff's skin care line did not constitute tarnishment under the
FTDA.43 Because the competitor's use did not associate Clinique with
obscene, sexual, or illegal connotations, and its products were not shoddy or
unwholesome, the court denied Clinique's claim of dilution by
tarnishment." Similarly, a court found that a skit making fun of Barney, the
purple dinosaur, did not amount to tarnishment, as the skit did not portray
Barney in an unwholesome light or link Barney to products of bad quality."
A company's own image and its use of the mark can affect whether
another's use tarnishes the mark. In Playboy Enterprises,Inc. v. Webbworld,
Inc., the adult magazine publisher failed to establish dilution by tarnishment
against an Internet site provider which sold adult images.' Playboy argued
that its mark was tarnished by its appearance on the Web site, which
contained hard core pornography.' The court declined to compare the

o MCCARTHY, supranote 35, at 24-172.
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F2d 200,203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
161 (2d Cir. 1979).
42 See, ag., Eastman Kodak Co. v. D.B. Rakow, 739 F. Supp. 116,15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1631 (W.D.
N.Y. 1989) (finding dilution where stand-up comedian used 'Kodak" as his stage name because his crude
jokes could harm the reputation of Kodak); Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F.Supp. 725,
12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1487 (N.D. IMI.1989) (finding dilution where candy company sold powdered gum
which closely resembled cocaine in a container strikingly similar to Coca-Cola bottle because Coca-Cola's
reputation would be lessened by association with an illegal drug).
' 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).

44Ia

s Lyons P'ship, L.P. v. Giannoulas, 14 F. Supp. 2d 947, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1759 (N.D. Tex. 1998).
991 F. Supp. 543, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (N.D. Tex. 1997).
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offensiveness of the adult images offered by the plaintiff and defendant,
deciding that Playboy's mark had not been tarnished.48
C. EXCEPTIONS TO THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT

Not every use that tarnishes a trademark is actionable under the FTDA.
The FTDA provides for the following exemptions: "(A) Fair use of a famous
mark by another person in comparative commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods or services of the owner of the famous
mark [,] (B) [n]oncommercial use of a mark [and] (C) [a]U forms of news
reporting and news commentary. " "'
The legislative history of the FTDA indicates a desire to protect such uses
in order to prevent dilution from giving famous trademark owners a
monopoly over the use of the mark.' In Mattel, Inc. v. MCR Records, for
example, the court held that even if a song that parodied the "Barbie" fashion
doll and the values she represents tarnished the "Barbie" mark, the song fell
within the noncommercial use exception of the FTDA.s1 The court
reasoned that because the song's use of the mark was for purposes of parody,
rather than to sell knock-off "Barbie" products, the use was noncommercial. 2
I. FEATURES OF THE INTERNET AND WORLD WIDE WEB

The increasing capabilities of the Internet and Web have created new
ways in which trademarks are susceptible to dilution by tarnishment. With
the tremendous amount of information available on the Web, organization
and classification of information has become increasingly important. Tools,
such as hyperlinks, metatag keywords, 3 and e-mail s' have tremendous

4Id

15 U.S.C.A. S 1125(c)(4) (2001).
o See Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v.Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1167,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1840 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S19306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29, 1995)).
s 28 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
S2 Id
" Metatag keywords are part of the Web page's source code, which is invisible to the ordinary Web
user. Metatags are used by some search engines to determine whether a site is a'hit" when a user performs
akeyword search. See Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 78 F. Supp. 2d 1066 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
For example, if a Web site creator includes the words 'Coca-Col" in the site's metatag keywords, a user
entering 'Coca-Cola" in a Yahoo keyword search would have the site included among those listed as 'hits"
4'
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organizational and practical use, making the Web a more efficient place to
locate information. However, these tools are prone to abuse that can
threaten intellectual property rights."s
A. DOMAIN NAMES

Each computer or network linked to the Internet has a unique numerical
address called an Internet Protocol number (IP number). 6 The IP number
is converted into a letter based format known as a domain name by
specialized computers called domain name servers."7 Domain names are
addresses that designate Web pages.5 8 Web pages are files of information,
which can include printed matter, sounds, pictures, and hyperlinks to other
Web pages.5 9
A domain name has two parts: a top-level domain and a secondary-level
domain. The top-level domain is the domain name's suffix.' There are six
primary top-level domains: "(1) .edu for educational institutions, (2) .org for
non-governmental and non-commercial organizations, (3) .gov for governmental entities, (4) .net for networks, (5) .com for commercial users, and (6)
a nation-specific domain, which is .us in the United States."'" The secondarylevel domain is the rest of the address, which can include letters, numbers,
and some symbols. 2 For example, in the domain name yahoo.com, .com is
the top-level domain and yahoo is the secondary-level domain.

in the search.
"4For trademark tarnishment cases involving e-mail, see Classified Ventures, L.L.C. v. Softcell Mktg.,
Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 898 (N.D. IMI.2000) (sending sparn e-mails containing advertisements for
pornography that listed a false return e-mail address using plaintiff company's name constitutes trademark
dilution); Am. Online, Inc. v. IMS, 24 F. Supp. 2d 548, 552, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857, 1860-61 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (holding that AOL mark was tarnished by defendant sending AOL users over 60 million spar
messages with aol.com in the message headers).
" SeegenerallyjeffreyR. Kuester &Peter A. Nieves, Hyperlinks, FramesandMetaTags:An Intellectual
PpertyAnalysis, 38 IDEA 243, 245 (1998) (stating that the tools are able to adversely affect intellectual
property rights through trademark dilution and trademark infringement, among other things).
" Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Sci. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 1997 WL 829341,45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1463 (CD. Cal. 1997), amended & superseded by 989 F. Supp. 1276 (1997).

Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1126 (D. Colo. 2000).
Sporty's Farm, L.L.C. v. Sportsman's Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2000).
"Id, at 492.
"
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Trademark dilution by tarnishment occurs in secondary-level domain
name selection. Hypothetically, if a Web site advocating the use of cocaine
used the domain name cocacola.com, Coca-Cola would have a strong claim
of trademark dilution by tarnishment. Courts have consistently held that
the "use of a famous trademark in a domain name used to purvey pornography constitutes dilution."63
For example, Hasbro, Inc., the owner of the mark "Candy Land," the
name of the company's popular family-oriented board game, obtained an
injunction based on trademark dilution against defendants who were using
candyland.com as an Internet domain name for a site featuring sexually
explicit material.' Similarly, a court enjoined a defendant under the FTDA
from using fordrecalls.com, a domain name that the court found confusingly
similar to Ford Motor Company's trademark, as a site displaying and selling
pornographic images.6 ' The court reasoned that the association of the Ford
mark with pornography tarnished the wholesome nature and integrity of the

mark." The court in Toys "R"Us v. Akkaoui used similar reasoning to enjoin
the defendant from maintaining a pornographic Web site at www.adultsrus.
com, a domain name confusingly similar to the mark of the plaintiff, Toys
67
"R" Us.
Such claims are successful because consumers, rather than using a search
engine, often type in a company name or logo, followed by .com in order to
locate an unknown domain name." In fact, in Ford Motor Co., the court
noted that several Ford customers had visited the fordrecalls.com site seeking
information about possible Ford recalls and called Ford Motor Company to
complain.69 If a consumer types in what he believes to be a company's home
page and is presented with offensive material, the company's wholesome
image may be tarnished by its association with that material.

Ford Motor Co. v. Lapertosa, 126 F. Supp. 2d 463, 466 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
"Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11626,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1479 (W.D. Wa. 1996).
6sFordMotor Co., 126 F. Supp. 2d at 466-67.
' Toys R Us v. Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, 40 U.S'P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
Sporty's Farm, 202 F.3d at 493.
'
126 F. Supp. 2d at 467.
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B. HYPERLINKS

Hyperlinks allow a user to connect almost instantly from one Web site
to another site (or to another page within the initial site) by clicking on a
designated space on the initial site.' The ability to hyperlink to other Web
pages creates the "web" of sites on the Internet. With links, Web "surfing"
from site to site is possible." Nearly every site, including search engines,
hyperlink to other sites.' Hyperlinks are often represented as underlined,
colored, or bold text, or a graphical image."3 Linking allows users to connect
to other Web pages quickly and efficiently, without having to perform a
search. 4 Deep linking refers to linking to an internal page of a Web site,
bypassing the home page that generally includes the basic introduction to
and identification of the site.7" Deep linking can lead to litigation because it
tends to cause consumer confusion, as viewers do not see the identifying
information on the home Web page.76
Hyperlinking has tremendous value both to Webmasters and Web
surfers. Users can bookmark a site with interesting and reliable links and are
then able to find information on subjects of interest without having to
bookmark each individual site." A Web site with good links can form a
loyal user base, increasing the site's goodwill and, in turn, its value to
advertisers." Hyperlinking is generally encouraged because hyperlinks
benefit the linked sites by bringing additional viewers. 9
Although hyperlinks have advantages, they can present potential liability
problems, particularly in the intellectual property arena. Web surfers,
t' Dale M. Cendali et al., An Oeview of Intellectual Property Issues Relating to the Internet, 89
TRADEMARK REP. 485, 523 (1999).
" David M. Mirchin, Can You heHeldLegally Liablefor HypertetLinking?, 8 CORP. LEGAL TIMES
83 (1998).
" Martin H. Samson, Hyperlink at Your Own Risk, N.Y.L.J. (June 24, 1997) WL, New York Law

Journal Database.
" See Kuester & Nieves, supra note 55, at 246.
74

Id

"

See Nicos L. Tsilas, Minimizing PotentialLiability Associated with Linking and Framingon the

World Wide Web, 8 COMmLAw CONSPECTUS 85,87 (Winter 2000). For litigation over deep linking, see
Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.com, Inc., CV 99-7654 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000).

" See David M. Kelly & ChristinaJ. Hieber, Confusion, DilutionStill Focus ofLinking Cases, NAT'L
L.J., Feb. 5. 2001, at C14, LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File.

" CarolEbbinghouse, WebmasterLiability:Look Before You Link, andOtberAdmonitionsforToday's
Webmaster, SEARCHER, Feb. 1, 1998, availableat 1998 WL 10425783.

ni
7'

Samson, supra note 72.
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especially those who are not "web savvy," may end up far from the site they
originally visited, with no idea how they got there and, possibly, with
confusion as to whether the sites are related."0 Web sites that provide
hyperlinks may face liability in the areas of unfair competition, copyright
8
infringement, and trademark violations. '
This Note will address two issues involving hyperlinks in the context of
trademark tarnishment: (1)Whether hyperlinking to an offensive Web site
is sufficient to establish liability for tarnishment, and (2) Whether
hyperlinking to a commercial Web site satisfies the commercial use
requirement of the FTDA. Part HI will discuss trademark tarnishment
resulting from links to offensive Web sites. Part IV will discuss the
"cybergriper" phenomenon, in which a disgruntled consumer or employee
creates a Web site to disparage a company or group. In the cybergriping
context, the analysis will focus on the court's reliance on links to establish
commercial use in dilution claims.
IM. TARNISHING A TRADEMARK BY HYPERLINKING TO OFFENSIVE
WEB SITES

It is well-established that one can tarnish a famous trademark by using it
as a domain name for an offensive Web site, such as one containing
pornography. 2 However, it is unclear whether using a famous trademark
in a Web site that contains hyperlinks to offensive sites tarnishes the mark
under the FTDA."3
A. DO HYPERLINKS ESTABLISH TRADEMARK TARNISHMENT?

Few courts have commented on this issue, but some cases provide insight
into how courts would treat hyperlinks in the context of tarnishment. For
example, the court in Archdiocese ofSt.Louis v. InternetEntertainmentGroup,

id
t See generally Manny D. Polotilow & Salvatore Guerriero, Cybenpace: The Intellectual Propery
Ramfications ofProvidingHypertext Links on a Web Site, INTELL. PROP. STRATEGIST, Feb. 2001, at 1,
LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File.
',See, e-g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entm't Group, Ltd., No. C96-130WD 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11626 (W.D. Wa. 1996). For a discussion of trademark tarnishment in domain name selection, see Part
1.A on domain names.
'" See Kelly & Hieber, supra note 76, at C14.
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Inc., found tarnishment of the plaintiff's spiritual trademarks by association
with Web sites advertising sexually explicit services. 4 There, the defendant's
Web sites papalvisit.com and papalvisitl999.com contained information
about the 1999 visit to St. Louis of Pope John Paul 11Y. These sites also
recited off-color jokes about the Roman Catholic Church and the Pope and
displayed banner ads linking to sexually explicit Web sites.8 6 It is unclear
whether the court would have found tarnishment based solely on links to
offensive material. Though the banner ads were links to sexually explicit
Web sites, the ads themselves may have displayed offensive material directly
on the defendant's sites. Nevertheless, the case demonstrates a court's
willingness to find tarnishment when a defendant associates a trademark with
offensive Web sites.
More recently, Morrison & Foerster, a law firm, sued an individual who
had registered several domain names, including www.morrisonfoerster.com,
morrisonandfoerster.com, morrisonforester.com, and morrisonandforester.
com. 7 The sites contained disparaging remarks about the firm and lawyers
in general."8 Additionally, the Web sites contained hyperlinks to other sites
with racist and off-color domain names, such as www.LetsDoSomelllegal
Steroids.com, www.JewKike.com, and www.NolrishNeedApply.com s9
Although the court did not reach the issue of dilution, ' the court
expressed concern that those visiting the defendant's sites might associate
Morrison & Foerster with the anti-Semitic, racist and offensive domain
names linked to by the defendant's sites.9' This association, the court
reasoned, could damage the law firm's goodwill.' This language shows
concern for the very harm the FTDA protects against. Thus, the court
likely would have found that the offensive hyperlinks tarnished the
plaintiff's mark had the court reached the dilution issue.

"Id The opinion has been withdrawn at the request of the court. Archdiocese of St. Louis v.
Internet Entm't Group, Inc., No. 499CV275NL 1999 WL 66022 (E.D. Mo. 1999).
Kelly & Hieber, supra note 76, at C14.

Id

V Morrison & Foerster, LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127 (D. Co. 2000).

Id at 1128.
The court granted injunctive relief to the plaintiff under the cybersquatting claim, and, therefore,
did not reach the other claims, including trademark infringement and dilution. See id at 1135-36. For a
discussion of cybersquatting, see infra note 110.
1 Morrison & Foerster,94 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
90

9d
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Nevertheless, courts have been hesitant to use hyperlinks as a basis for
trademark tarnishment. In Bally Total Fitness, the court stated that when a
Web site containing a trademark merely hyperlinks to an unsavory site, such
links do not constitute trademark dilution by tarnishment. 93 There, the
defendant maintained a Web site named "Bally sucks" that was devoted to
criticizing the plaintiff corporation, which operates fitness centers throughout the United States." The site instructed viewers how to cancel a Bally
fitness center membership, contained editorial criticism of Bally, and
featured a "Complaint Guestbook," which allowed visitors to add their own
complaints and comments about Bally to the site.9" The site, at one time,
hyperlinked to a site named "Images of Men," which displayed male
pornography targeted to the gay community.' At the time of litigation, the
defendant had removed the links, but both the "Bally Sucks" site and the
"Images of Men" site maintained the same domain name.9'
The plaintiff argued that the close proximity between the "Bally sucks"
site and the pornographic site tarnished the Bally trademark. The court,
though, found this argument unpersuasive.98 Even if the direct hyperlinks
had remained, the court reasoned, there was never pornographic material
directly located on the "Bally sucks" site and, thus, no tarnishment."
Cautioning against use of hyperlinks as the basis of tarnishment, the court
stated that "[1]ooking beyond the 'Bally sucks' site to other sites within the
domain or to other linked sites would, to an extent, include the Internet in
its entirety.""° The court reasoned that the "essence" of the Internet and
Web was the connection between Web sites for information access purposes.
Thus, including linked sites as grounds for dilution would exceed the
purpose of the FTDA. 1

"

Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
I4dla
at1162. "Cybergriping," as this practice iscommonly known, is discussed fully in Part IV.

sOscar S. Cisneros, Berkeley TechnologyJournalAnnualReviewofLaw and Technology; Trademark
Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 15 BERKELEY TECl .J.229, 235 (2000).
Bally Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.

The "Bally Sucks" site address was www.compupixcom/ballysucks and the Images of Men" site
address was www.compupix.com/index. Idat 1162, 1168.
" Id at 1168.

Id.

Id at1168.
Id
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B. REMEMBERING THE PURPOSE OF THE FTDA

The purpose of the FTDA is to prevent uses of a famous trademark
which lessen "the capacity of [the mark] to identify and distinguish goods or
services," even when there is no "likelihood of confusion."" ° The legislative
history and dilution cases establish that trademark tarnishment is a harm
targeted by the FTDA. When a mark is associated with offensive material,
such as pornography, it is tarnished because its ability to serve as a wholesome identifier of a product is lessened, even if the consumer is not confused
by the association. In this way, the FTDA recognizes the "aura" of a
03
mark.
The FTDA does not address a concrete harm; it targets the more abstract
harm that offensive connotations cause to the psychological associations
consumers form with a mark."° A hyperlink from a site that uses a famous
mark to a pornographic Web site can create a psychological association of
the mark with pornography in the mind of the viewer, even if the viewer
knows that the trademark owner is not sponsoring the pornographic site.
As long as the commercial use requirement is satisfied,0 5 such hyperlinks
should constitute trademark dilution by tarnishment under the FTDA.
Liability, though, should extend only to hyperlinks located directly on
the Web page that uses the trademark. The court in Bally Total Fitness
correctly stated that broadening trademark tarnishment claims to other Web
sites within the domain name would extend liability too far and exceed the
purposes of the FTDA.1 0 The mark and the offensive use must be close
enough in proximity to create a psychological connection between the mark
and the offensive material in the viewer's mind. Courts should only allow
tarnishment claims when the mark and the pornographic (or other offensive)
hyperlink are on the same Web page. This rule would confine liability to a
reasonable scope.

15 U.S.C. S 1127 (2000).
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 3 (1995).
"0 See N.Y. State Soc'y of Certified Pub. Accountants v. Eric Louis Assocs., Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 331,
346 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (portraying products in an 'unsavory context [is] likely to evoke unflattering
1

thoughts about the owner's product').

10 For a discussion of the commercial
10 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp.

use requirement, see Part IV.c.
v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1168 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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IV. CYBERGRIPING: Do HYPERLINKS ESTABLISH A COMMERCIAL
USE FOR TRADEMARK TARNISHMENT?
A. WHAT IS CYBERGRIPING?

"Cybergriping" is a relatively new but common phenomenon, where a
consumer or former employee maintains a Web site devoted to criticizing a
company or group.'0 7 Often, these sites use the company's trademark in the
domain name or on the Web page. Cybergripers often choose domain
names that consist of the company's mark, followed by sucks.com.'0 8 For
example, cybergriper Dan Parisi spent approximately $100,000 to register the
domain names of over 500 large companies followed by sucks.corn, including
Merilllynchsucks.com.1 " Companies faced with a cybergriping Web site can
sue under the theories of trademark infringement, trademark dilution, unfair
competition, and cybersquatting; n ° they also may commence an arbitration
proceeding under the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers (ICANN) Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)."'
Cybergriping has become so widespread that some companies have registered

' Jay H. Begler & Mark J. Speciner, Handling Vybegriper' Phenomenon: When Consumers or
DisgruntledEmployees Set Up Web Sites to Criticize Your Company, 225 N.Y.L.J. 24 (2001).

Id

I Greg Farrell, From Sour Grapes to Online Whine: FirmsDread Creationof Gripes'Portal,USA
TODAY, Apr. 7,2000, at IB, aailableat 2000 WL 5774571.
10 Cybersquatting isthe practice of registering domain names that are identical or confusingly similar
to a company's mark and then attempting to sell the domain name to the company or use the domain
name to misdirect viewers toward the cybersquatter's Web site. Elke Flores Suber & Michael Cukor,
Whose Cybrpae is it Anyway? Seeral Forumsfor Ending Domain Name Disputes, METROPOLITAN
CORPORATE COUNSEL, Sept. 2001, at 18. Alleged cybersquatter Dennis Toeppen acquired over 100
domain names using trademarks, including eddiebauer.com and nieman-marcus.com, and has been sued
by several corporations. Panavision, Int'l
L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1319,46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1511,1514 (9th Cir. 1998). Toeppen allegedly offered to sell Panavision the domain name panavision.com
for $13,000. Panavision, Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296, 1300,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1908, 1910
(C.D. Cal. 1996); Ebbinghouse, sura note 77. He also offered to sell intermatic.com to Intermatic, Inc.
for $10,000 and americanstandard.com to American Standard, Inc. for $15,000. PanavisionInt LP., 141
F.3d at 1319. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), an amendment to the Lanham
Act, provides protection against cybersquatters who register marks as domain names in bad faith. See 15
U.S.C. S 1125(d) (2001).
'.Begler & Speciner, supra note 107, at S1. ICANN offers UDRP as an option to avoid lengthy and
costly litigation over domain names. The remedies available under UDRP are cancellation or transfer of
ownership of the domain name. A complainant must prove that the domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to the complainant's trademarkor service mark, that the registrant has no legitimate
rights in the domain name, and that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith. Suber &
Cukor, supra note 110.
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domain names that potential cybergripers might choose to use. Chase
Manhattan Bank, for example, has registered the domain names
Chasesucks.com, IhateChase.com, and ChaseStinks.com."' Following in
suit, U-Haul registered the domain name UHaulsucks.com, and Porsche
registered Porschesucks.com."'
B. CYBERGRIPING GENERALLY: FREE SPEECH ISSUES

The First Amendment and the FTDA's requirement of commercial use
usually dispel trademark dilution liability of a cybergriper. As the legislative
history of the FTDA indicates, the noncommercial exception to the Act
prohibits "dilution actions that seek to enjoin use of famous marks in
'noncommercial' uses (such as consumer product reviews).""" The House
Report concerning the FTDA states that the noncommercial exception
section "is designed to preclude the courts from enjoining speech that courts
have recognized to be constitutionally protected."' Thus, courts agree that
typical cybergriping sites fall squarely within this noncommercial exception
because their purpose is to provide a forum for consumer product reviews.
For instance, in Northland Insurance Cos. v. Blaylock, the defendant
created two Web sites, with the domain names northlandinsurance.com and
sailinglegacy.com, to criticize the plaintiff's insurance business.'
The
complained about how the plaintiff dealt with the defendant's insurance
claim for a damaged yacht, detailed the litigation that resulted from the yacht
dispute, and provided viewers a forum for expressing their own complaints
117
about Northland Insurance.
The plaintiff argued that the cybergriping site diluted its trademark by
tarnishing it, but the court rejected this argument. Instead, the court found
that the defendant's use of the mark was "for noncommercial commentary
purposes.""' The court stated that the FTDA did not apply to "forms of

",

Dale M. Cendali et al., An Oweniew of Intlectual Property Issues Relating to the Internet, 89

TRADEMA.K REP. 485, 517 n.140 (1999).

m Farrell, supra note 109.
H.R. REP. No. 104-374, at 8 (1995).

"

Itsi,
t' Northland

Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F, Supp. 2d 1108, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662 (D. Minn.

2000).
dL at 1114.
II Id at 1123.
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expression that are not part of a commercial transaction. " "' The court
reasoned that Congress intended that "the federal anti-dilution law [could
not] be used as a legal riposte to uses of trademark in negative product
reviews in the media, or negative opinions expressed about company
policies." 2 ' Thus, the court held, the plaintiff was unlikely to prevail on the
21
merits of its FTDA claim.'
An ex-employee of Bridgestone-Firestone, Inc. set up a similar site at
www.bridgestone-firestone.com to complain about the company's pension
payment policies.'" Bridgestone-Firestone initiated arbitration proceedings
under ICANN's Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (URDP) to settle the
domain name dispute.'2 A World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) arbitrator ruled that the site constituted "legitimate noncommercial
use."'124 The respondent's primary purpose in registering the domain name
and maintaining the site, the arbitrator concluded, was to "exercise... his
free speech right to criticize [Bridgestone-Firestone]." 25 Although this was
not a trademark dilution case under the FTDA, the finding that cybergriping
is noncommercial, protected speech is certainly influential.
The court in Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com also indicated,
in dicta, that such sites are protected as either criticism or parody.2 6 There,
Lucent Technologies brought an in rem action under the AntiCybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA) against the domain name
lucentsucks.com, which allegedly contained pornographic materials. 1 7 In
discussing cybergriping sites, the court stated that 'sucks' has "entered the

Id. at 1122.

'19

Id. at 1122 (quoting THOMAS McCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETrON S 24:97.2 (4th ed. 1998)).
uI NorthlandIns. Cos., 115 F. Supp. 2d at 1123.
w W7PO PanelAllows 'Cybgriper'to Keep Domain That Uses Company lame, PENSION FUND
LITIGATION REPORTER, Oct. 19,2000, at 11, LEXIS, Legal Publications Group File (citing Bridgestone
Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, No. D2000-0190 (W.IP.O. Arbitration and Mediation Ctr., July 6, 2000)).
' Id For a discussion of ICANN's UDRP arbitration option, see supra note I11.
1, WIPO Panel Allows 'Cybergriper' to Keep Domain That Uses Company Name, supra note 122
(quoting Bridgestone Firestone, Inc. v. Myers, No. D2000-0190 (WI.P.O. Arbitration and Mediation Ctr.,

July 6, 2000)).
as Id

16

Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com, 95 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535-36, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1653

(ED. Va. 2000).
2 Id at 529. The court held that Lucent Technologies did not comply with the due diligence
requirement of the ACPA in rem suit provision, and, thus, dismissed the suit, but went on to discuss
cybergriping Web sites generally. Id
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vernacular as a word loaded with criticism."2
A showing that the
sucks.com Web site is parody or a forum for critical commentary, the court
reasoned, would undermine an action under the ACPA,"' because such uses
are "noncommercial or fair use of the mark.""
Courts and commentators have pointed out the positive consequences of
protecting speech criticizing corporations. In L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake
Publishers,Inc., the court held that a sexually-oriented parody of L.L. Bean's
clothing catalogue in a commercial adult magazine was noncommercial use
of the trademark. "1 ' In discussing the state anti-dilution statute at issue, the
court noted:
If the anti-dilution statute were construed as permitting a
trademark owner to enjoin the use of his mark in a noncommercial context found to be negative or offensive, then a
corporation could shield itself from criticism by forbidding
the use of its name in commentaries critical of its conduct.
The legitimate aim of the anti-dilution statute is to prohibit
the unauthorized use of another's trademark in order to
market incompatible products or services. The Constitution
does not, however, permit the range of the anti-dilution
statute to encompass the unauthorized use of a trademark in
a noncommercial setting such as an editorial or artistic
context.'
A policy favoring noncommercial criticism of a company also provides
that company and its competitors with incentives to provide good service.'
One commentator argues that if a company were able to silence criticism
about its goods or services, the company would not have as much of an
incentive to create goodwill in its mark by providing good customer

-I'h at 535 (quoting Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164 (C.D.
Cal. 1998)).
'

Lucent Tcb., Inc., 95 F. Supp. 2d at 535.

"'Idat 536. Under the ACPA, a plaintiff must show that the defendant registered the domain name

in "bad faith.* Courts consider nine factors to determine whether there is bad faith, and one of these
factors is whether the use isnoncommercial. Id
.. L.L. Bean, Inc. v. Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987).
132

d

" Cisneros, supra note 95.
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service. 34 Cybergriping sites can serve as a "watchdog" in the industry,
which will encourage the industry as a whole to provide better service to
35

customers. 1

Additionally, protecting such speech allows consumers to have more
informed opinions of companies."6 With the existence of cybergriping sites,
a would-be consumer can view a range of information about the company
online. The consumer is not limited to the company's own advertising on
the Web, but can also view comments that former consumers have made
about the company.17 Thus, the consumer can make an informed decision
3
whether or not to purchase the company's goods or use its services.
Cybergriping sites are not always protected, particularly if the court finds
the owner registered the site for the sole purpose of selling it to the
trademark owner. In another arbitration proceeding, WIPO ordered Purge
IT, a British company, to transfer natwestsucks.com, standardcharteredsucks.
com, directlinesucks.com, dixonssucks.com, and freeservesucks.com, to the
respective companies.139 The arbitrator found that the company bought the
domain names solely to sell them to the companies for large sums, rather
than exercise free speech by complaining about the targeted companies.140
In fact, Purge admitted that it had never used the domain names and only
intended to sell them to the companies involved. 4 ' Had the sites been
maintained for true cybergriping, rather than registered for cybersquatting
purposes, they should have received protection as noncommercial use.
C. DO HYPERLINKS TRANSFORM FREE SPEECH INTO COMMERCIAL USE OF
A MARK?

Although typical cybergriping sites are noncommercial and, thus,
protected from tarnishment claims, some courts have held that hyperlinks
from the cybergriping site to a commercial site establish commercial use. 42
"I Id. at 239.
11
"'

Id at 240.
Id.

"

Cisneros, supra note 95.
Jane Martinson, Companies Win Sucks.com Fight, GUARDIAN, Aug. 19, 2000, at 2.

14

Id

3

141Id

" See, eg., OBH, Inc. v. Spotlight Magazine, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 176,192-93, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1570 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 993 F. Supp. 282, 307-8 (D. New Jersey 1"8).
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In Jeuwsforjesus v. Brodsky, for example, a non-profit international outreach
ministry that teaches Jesus is the Messiah, and states as its mission "advocacy,
education and religious camaraderie for both Gentiles and Jews," filed suit
against a professional Internet developer and attorney who posted criticism
of the ministry on the Internet site jewsforjesus.org.14 The defendant's site
invited the user to "click here to learn more about how the Jews for Jesus cult
is founded upon deceit and distortion of fact." If the user clicked on the
hyperlink provided, the user was connected to the Web site of the Outreach
Judaism Organization, a religious group also vocally opposed to the
plaintiff's ministry.144
The defendant argued that his site was exempt from trademark dilution
law under the "non-commercial" exception of the FTDA."4 ' The court
disagreed, finding the jewsforjesus.org site to be commercial in two ways.
First, the court found that the site constituted commercial use because the
site was intended to prevent Internet users from locating the true site of the
Jews for Jesus ministry, thus, harming the plaintiff commercially.'1 More
interestingly, though, the court found that the site was a commercial use
because it provided a hyperlink to the Outreach Judaism Organization Web
site, which solicited funds through the sale of merchandise. 4" The court
reasoned that jewsforjesus.org acted as a conduit to a commercial site, thus
rendering it commercial in nature."
Similarly, in OBH, Inc., the court disagreed with a cybergriping
defendant's contention that his site was non-commercial and, thus, exempt
from the FTDA.149 There, The Buffalo News sued the Internet Web site
operator of thebuffalonews.com, a site which contained disparaging
comments about The Buffalo News and hyperlinks to other local news
sources, under a variety of theories, including trademark dilution. s As in
JewsforJesus, the defendant in OBH,Inc. asserted FTDA exemption under

'" Jewsforjesus,993
14

F. Supp. at 290.

la at 291 n.15.

I, at 307. See U.S.C. S 1125(c)(4)(B).
Id
Jew for Jesus, 993 F. Supp. at 307. For criticism that this argument is "circular," see Leslie C.
Rochat, Comment, 'I See W1hat You're Saying. TrademarkedTerms and Symbols as Protected Consumer
4

Commentary in Consumer Opinion Websites, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 599, 613-14 (2000).
147 Id
14

OBH,Inc., 86 F. Supp. at 192-93.
Id at 182-83.
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the non-commercial exception."' The court, however, found the defendant's
site to be commercial, as it contained a hyperlink to the defendant's other
Web site, the online version of Apartment Spotlight Magazine, which the
defendant operated for commercial purposes." 2
In addition to using hyperlinks to establish commercial use for claims
under the FTDA, courts have also used hyperlinks to establish commercial
use for trademark infringement cases under the Lanham Act." 3 A claim of
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act is only applicable to
commercial uses of another's mark." 4 In Bihariv. Gross, an interior designer
sued a former client whose Web sites designscam.com and
manhattaninteriordesign.com contained disparaging remarks about the
plaintiff, alleging that the designer engaged in scams to defraud clients.' 5
Although the Gross Web sites did not offer any "commercial transaction," the court found that the sites constituted commercial use for
trademark infringement." 6 The defendants did not sell visitors any product
or services, but the Web sites contained hyperlinks to sites which promoted
the services of other interior designers."5 ' These hyperlinks, the court
reasoned, made the Gross Web sites conduits, "steering potential customers
away from Bihari Interiors and toward its competitors," thereby rendering
the site commercial use. 18
Not all courts, though, have been willing to find commercial use of
cybergriping Web sites through hyperlinking to sites that sell merchandise.
In Bally TotalFitness,Bally brought suit against the operator of "Bally sucks,"
located at the address www.compupix.com/ballysucks.5 9 Faber operated

...Id at 192. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(4)(B) (1995).
152

OHB,Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d at 192-93.

See Bihari v. Gross, 119 F. Supp. 2d 309,56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1489 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
I at 318. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1) (1995) (stating that the Lanham Act applies only to actions
taken by individuals 'in connection with any goods or services'). The court has interpreted this language
to require a commercial use. Further, the court states, S 43(a) of the Lanham Act (trademark
3

infringement) is limited by 15 U.S.C. S 1125(c)(4)(B) (1995), which states that "[n]oncommercial use of
a mark" is not actionable under the Lanham Act. See BMJari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
Bibari, 119 F. Supp. 2d at 313.
£56 Id at 318.
15 Id

" Id Although the court found the Gross sites to be commercial use, the court held that there was
no likelihood of confusion, and, thus, no trademark infringement, and that the use of the mark in a
metatag keyword was protected by the fair use doctrine. 1d at 319-21.
£55 Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161,50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1840 (C.D.
Cal. 1998).
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several Web sites in addition to his "Bally sucks" site, which were all located
in the domain www.compupix.com. These other sites included "Images of
Men," a Web site displaying and selling photos of nude men and another
Web site advertising "Drew Faber Web Site Services," at www.compupix.
com/biz.htm. 6°
Bally argued that Faber's hyperlinking to commercial sites, such as the
one advertising his Web services, rendered the "Bally sucks" site commercial
innature.161 The court, though, rejected this argument, and found that the
"Bally sucks" site was non-commercial in nature and, thus, not trademark
dilution." First, the court stated that "mere use of another's name on the
Internet... is not per se commercial use."1 63 The court then pointed to the
legislative history of the FTDA to decide that the "Bally sucks" site was
noncommercial. In congressional hearings, Senator Orin Hatch stated that
the FTDA "will not prohibit or threaten noncommercial expression, such
as parody, satire, editorial and otherforms of expression that are not part ofa
commercial transaction." " The court reasoned that the non-commercial
exception would encompass customer product reviews, such as the "Bally
sucks" Web site.161
The court refused to allow hyperlinks to commercial sites to render the
cybergriping site commercial in nature. The court reasoned that Faber was
not using the "Bally sucks" site to sell his services, but, rather, was using the
site to allow customer product review of Bally's services.' 66 Faber's linking
to and mentioning his other sites, some of which were commercial, was
comparable to, the court stated, "an on-line resume."' 67 Because the "Bally
sucks" site was not directly involved in commercial transactions, the court
found it to be non-commercial and, thus, exempt from the FTDA."'

11Id. at 1162.
"

'
"6

Id at 1166.
Idat 1167.
i at 1166.

'" Bally TotalFitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167 (quoting 141 Cong. Rec.

S 19306-10 (daily ed. Dec. 29,

1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added)).
16 id
I" Id

19 Id

'" See id
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E. FOCUS ON THE SITE'S PURPOSE

Although they reach different conclusions, the preceding cases, with
respect to commercial use, are consistent with the purpose of the FTDA and
its legislative history.169
If a cybergriping site's primary purpose is commercial competition with
the criticized company, rather than providing a forum for protected
criticism, a finding of commercial use is warranted. If, for example, a Web
site with the domain name pepsisucks.com offered criticism of Pepsi and
contained a direct hyperlink to Coca-Cola's Web site, a court should find a
commercial use for FTDA purposes. This is because the cybergriping site's
primary purpose is not to provide a forum for criticism of Pepsi, but to
redirect consumers to a commercial competitor of Pepsi, by way of a
hyperlink, after the consumers have just read disparaging remarks about
Pepsi. That makes the purpose of the site commercial, rather than expression of protected speech. In such a case, the defendant should be liable, as
long as the court finds that the cybergriping site causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the famous trademark.
Similarly, the defendant's cybergriping site in Bihariv. Grosshyperlinked
to competitors of the plaintiff. These hyperlinks indicate that the site's
purpose was to steer viewers to commercial competitors of the plaintiff, not
merely to provide a forum for criticism of the plaintiff. Thus, the court
correctly held that the site was commercial use.
If a site's purpose does not include commercial competition with the
criticized company, though, there is no basis for finding commercial use. A
court that finds commercial use by hyperlinks to unrelated sites that offer
commercial transactions is employing a view of "commercial use" that is
overly broad. The FTDA states that there can be liability for trademark
dilution only by "another person's commercialuse in commerce of a mark or
trade name." 7 0 The "use in commerce" language requires an aspect of
interstate commerce to be present before the dilution provision can be
triggered.17 When a person maintains a Web site where consumers criticize
a company, that free speech should not be transformed into "commercial use

See Bally Total Fitness,29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
vn 15 U.S.C. S1125(c)(1) (1995) (emphasis added).
'' H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995).
"9
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in commerce" of the mark by hyperlinks to unrelated sites that happen to
sell goods or services.
Thus, in Bally Total Fitness, the court correctly decided that Faber's
hyperlinks to advertisements for his Internet services did not render his
cybergriping commercial in nature. The "Bally sucks" site was unrelated to
interstate commerce; rather, its purpose was to provide a forum for
expressing criticism of Bally Total Fitness.7 2
As with the trademark tarnishment by hyperlinks analysis, the court's
analysis of commercial use should end with the cybergriping site's own
hyperlinks. A court should not consider whether other sites within the
domain contain links to commercial sites. Doing so would extend liability
too far on the Web.
VI. CONCLUSION

This analysis highlights how courts have dealt with hyperlinks as both a
basis for tarnishment and commercial use in claims brought under the
Federal Trademark Dilution Action of 1995. Courts disagree over whether
tarnishment results from using a famous mark on a Web site and
hyperlinking to an offensive site.' In light of the policies of the FTDA,
courts should allow hyperlinks to offensive Web sites to constitute
trademark dilution by tarnishment if the commercial use requirement of the
Act is met. This is because a hyperlink from a site using a mark to an
offensive site, such as one containing pornographic images, can form a
psychological association between the mark and pornography in the
consumer's mind. This association lessens the mark's ability to serve as a
wholesome identifier of its product. Liability for using hyperlinks in this
way, though, should be limited to the hyperlinks that are directly located on
the allegedly diluting site, so that the scope of the FTDA is not exceeded.
Courts have also expressed different views on whether hyperlinks to
commercial sites can establish that a cybergriping site is commercial use for
the purposes of the FTDA. 74 A hyperlink to an unrelated Web site that is
commercial in nature should not render a cybergriping site commercial use
because the cybergriper is not engaged in interstate commerce in connection

"
'

See BaUy Total Fitness, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1167.
See Kelly & Hieber, supra note 76.

V4 Id
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with the mark. The primary purpose of such a site is expression of criticism,
which qualifies as a noncommercial use. However, when a cybergriping site
hyperlinks to a competitor of the target company, a finding of commercial
use is warranted. As the hyperlink redirects viewers to a commercial
competitor of the target company, the purpose of the site becomes commercial in nature.
In deciding these difficult questions, courts should focus on the purpose
of the FTDA and the type harm from which it intends to protect famous
marks. By focusing on the purpose and scope of the Act, courts can transfer
traditional trademark law properly to the new horizon of the Internet and
World Wide Web.
MARTHA KELLEY
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